Question:
I work as a pharmacist, and the purpose of my inquiry is to determine the moral permissibility of selling contraceptive products; in some circumstances, I have refused to do so, which has caused discomfort and surprise among my customers, especially married women with several children. For this reason, I would like clear and precise guidance on the problem I am facing.
Answer:
Dear Sir or Madam:
There are essentially two moral principles from which we must proceed (and apply to our specific case):
1. First and foremost, it is never permissible to perform an intrinsically evil act or to cooperate directly and formally with the intrinsically evil act of a third party. “Formal cooperation in evil” is understood to mean any act that:
a) either through the collaborator’s own intention—let us call this subjective formal cooperation—(for example, someone who lends money knowing with certainty that it will be used for evil, and agrees with the sin that the person asking for it will commit),
b) or by the intrinsic purpose of the act itself—what we might call objective formal cooperation—contributes to another’s sin (for example, someone who manufactures amulets used solely for superstitious purposes, intending to profit from such a business rather than to promote superstition); in the latter case, it cannot be said that their contribution to another’s sin is merely accidental, since the action they perform cannot result in anything other than another’s sin.
2. Second, as a general rule, it would also not be lawful to perform an act that is in itself good or indifferent but which in fact contributes to another’s sin. This is known as material cooperation in evil. In this type of cooperation, the act performed by the cooperator may occur both in the context of a good action and within the framework of another’s evil action; and in the latter case, the one who sins in some way “abuses” the act performed by the so-called “cooperator.” We have said “as a general rule” because there may be situations in which sufficiently serious reasons exist to justify the performance of such acts, which in themselves are not evil but which, under these circumstances, lend themselves to the harm of others (for example, a wine seller who suspects that a customer is buying wine to get drunk.“Selling wine” does not in itself involve any malice)—in other circumstances, however, such cooperation—even if it is merely material—cannot be provided under any circumstances. For material cooperation to be lawful, certain conditions must be met, namely:
a) The cooperator’s action must be good in itself or at least indifferent. When speaking of the “goodness” or “indifference” of an action, we must not forget that, from a moral standpoint, an action is said to be good first and foremost when its moral object is good—that is, that which the action concerns or is directed toward in and of itself, regardless of the intentions of the person performing it (such as helping the needy). Therefore, this first condition requires us to examine, above all, the moral quality of the object toward which the action is intrinsically directed, to determine whether it is good, indifferent, or evil—that is, whether it intrinsically conforms to the rules of reason and faith (such as loving God), or is at odds with them (such as stealing another’s property), or is simply neither (such as going to the countryside). I emphasize this because it is of particular importance (and a source of much confusion). Here is an example: in the case of a merchant who sells a pornographic magazine, the action he performs—if we consider it morally—is not “selling” (as is confusingly stated in some publications), because its moral object has not yet been considered; strictly speaking, the moral object is “selling pornography”—that is, “a product that can only have a sinful use”—which is in itself intrinsically evil and falls under the first principle we outlined above, namely, formal cooperation (which will be objective or subjective depending on whether or not the seller agrees with the sin committed by the buyer).
b) The person performing the act must have an honest intention, that is, to desire only the good effect that follows from their action and to reject the evil one (otherwise, they would fall into subjective formal cooperation).
c) The good effect intended by the person performing the act must not be a consequence of the evil effect, because one must not do evil in order for good to result (cf. Rom 2:8). Often the connection between material cooperation and the evil effect is so close, necessary, and determinative of the sinful act that it becomes impossible to separate it from the act itself; it is therefore always a sin (such is the case, for example, with the cooperation provided by a surgical nurse during an abortion for the sole purpose of keeping her job: although her actions are the same as those she would perform in a legitimate surgical procedure, in this case they are so intimately connected with the abortion that they constitute a sin and are, in this instance, punished by the Church with excommunication).
d) There must be a cause that is proportionally serious and commensurate with the harm that will result from material cooperation in evil. Generally speaking, the more proximate the material cooperation, the more serious the reason required; likewise, the stronger the person’s obligation to avoid such cooperation by virtue of his profession, and the more serious the good violated and the resulting harm, the more serious the reason must be. To such an extent that there are no causes proportionate to certain harms or to the theological scandal that certain forms of cooperation—no matter how material they may be—may entail.
When these conditions are properly met (a good or indifferent act, an honest end, a more or less remote effect, and a grave cause), the cooperation provided is merely material. One might help determine the objective materiality or formality of the cooperation by observing whether the principal agent, in order to commit his sin, “abuses” the good or indifferent act of the cooperator or whether he gives it the proper and intrinsic “use” to which it is inherently ordered. In the first case, the cooperation is material; in the second, it is formal. The thief who takes a taxi to the scene of the robbery abuses the taxi driver’s act, even if the driver harbors some suspicion about his passenger’s character. But does the drug addict who buys a dose of drugs from a dealer abuse the dealer’s act of “selling”?
2. With all this in mind, we can apply it to the case in question. Let us distinguish two situations here:
1. The pharmacist-owner—the one with decision-making authority over the pharmacy’s operations—or the one whose specific role is the conscious sale of medications requested by customers:
1.1. The sale of items that, by their very nature, serve only to facilitate sin constitutes formal cooperation with the buyer’s sin, even if the seller does not share the buyer’s sinful intentions. Such is the case with the sale of contraceptive devices (condoms, spermicides, etc.) and abortifacients; the intention of the purchaser leaves no room for doubt, and the items sold cannot have any praiseworthy use.
1.2. The situation is different for products that are not abortifacients and that, in and of themselves, can be used for both contraceptive and therapeutic purposes (indicated, for example, in cases of hypogonadism, functional bleeding, etc.). In this case, they may be sold as long as there is no evidence of an intention to use them exclusively for contraception. In any case, the pharmacist must always request a prescription, thereby providing a means to avoid cooperation in evil; furthermore, depending on the extent of their expertise, they can discern the intended use of the product through the prescription. When there is no certainty of misuse, their cooperation (in the event that the product is indeed used for contraceptive purposes) is merely material.
2. The case of those whose work has no direct connection to the specific nature of what is being sold, such as a cashier, who merely processes payments; the person who packs orders; or the person who delivers them to customers’ homes. Their actions are, in reality, only remotely related to the essence of the product being sold, and therefore their cooperation is merely material.
In short, the lucid words of Pius XII apply to all of you: “You often have to struggle against the importunity, pressure, and demands of customers who turn to you, seeking to make you accomplices in their criminal schemes. Now, you know this: from the moment a product, by its very nature and by the customer’s intention, is unquestionably intended for a culpable purpose—no matter what the pretext, no matter what the entreaties—you cannot agree to take part in these attacks against the life or integrity of individuals, against the birth rate, or against the physical and mental health of humanity.” (Pius XII, To the Participants in the First International Congress of Catholic Pharmacists, September 2, 1950).
P. Miguel A. Fuentes, IVE
