Question:

Good afternoon Father, I hope you can answer me; you know, I want to ask you if after having made the sacrament of confession one tries not to sin again, one resists, but the bad thoughts are there even if one fights against them. People sometimes have bad thoughts, sometimes they are impure, and that is my doubt, and that is why sometimes I do not receive communion because I am afraid of committing sacrilege because of these bad thoughts.

Betty, from Peru (Age: 21)

Answer:

Betty:

What you consult me corresponds to the subject of ‘ internal sins ‘.

Internal sins are those that are realized with only the internal powers of man, that is, the understanding, the will, the imagination and the memory. The principal ones are three: the morose complacency in an evil thing proposed as present by the imagination, but without the intention of realizing it; the desire for a future evil thing, and the joy or approval of a past evil thing.

1) Morose Complacency

It is the delight in the imaginary representation of a sinful act as if it were being performed, but without the intention of performing it. In vulgar language it is usually designated by the name of bad thoughts. If they refer to lust, they are more properly called impure thoughts or evil thoughts.

For morbid indulgence to be sinful, it is necessary that it should be perceived as sinful and deliberately indulged in in spite of this. He who absent-mindedly thinks an evil thing without noticing that it is sinful and rejects it on the spot when he notices it, has not committed sin, even if he had remained for some time in that unnoticed thought. In practice it is difficult not to notice promptly the malice of the evil thought or imagination.

From this we must draw the following moral principles:

(a) Inward and voluntary indulgence in a sinful representation is always sin. For no one would delight in these internal representations if he did not feel inclination to the evil work which they represent, even if he had no intention of actually performing it; so that deliberate consent to such delectation supposes approval of the sinful thing or freely inclined affection for it. Hence, we are told in Sacred Scripture that ‘the thoughts of the wicked are abominable before God’ (Prov. 15:26).

(b) Morbid indulgence receives its species and gravity from the evil object freely and voluntarily represented. This means that the sin of internal indulgence will be grave or light according to the gravity of the object, and will belong to the same moral species to which the object belongs.

On the other hand, it is debated among moralists whether morbid indulgence also includes the circumstances that change the species of sin (for example, whether it is a different sin to imagine a single person, a married person, or a relative). Speculatively it seems that it does not, since the thought usually falls on the object insofar as it is apt to produce delight, disregarding the circumstances, which add nothing to it in this sense; and so, for example, he considers the married woman or relative, not as such, but as beautiful, and in this he takes pleasure. St. Alphonsus Liguori, however, is in favor of explaining in the confession, as far as possible, these circumstances that change the species of sin, because it is very easy that the sinner has taken them into account or desired them, at least with an ineffective desire; and the desire certainly includes the object as it is in itself, that is, with all its individual circumstances.

(c) The study or speculative knowledge of dangerous things is not a sin when there is just cause for it and there is a right intention. And so, for example, the priest can and should study the difficult matters of moral theology that refer to lust, marriage, etc., in order to rightly administer the sacrament of Penance; the doctor can and should study anatomy, gynecology, etc., for the competent exercise of his profession, etc. But they must study or think about these things with right intention and rejecting the morose complacency that they could awaken.

2) Evil Desire

It is the deliberate craving for an evil thing. Therefore, it always refers to the future time

It is divided into: (a) Effective (when there is absolute intention or purpose to execute an evil thing when the opportune moment presents itself); (b) Ineffective or conditioned (when there is no intention to execute it). It is rather a fickleness (e.g., I would like to do such a thing if it were lawful or possible).

The moral principles by which evil desires are to be judged are:

(a) The efficacious evil desire is always sin of the same species and gravity as the external act clothed with all the individual circumstances. The reason is because all the goodness or malice of human acts is taken from the interior will, since the external act adds no special morality to the internal, but only an accidental complement. That is why the Lord says in the Gospel: ‘Whoever looks at a woman and desires her has already committed adultery with her in his heart’ (Mt. 5:28). Evil desire gathers all the malice of the external act with all its circumstances. And so, if the evil desire fell on a certain married person or relative, it would not be enough to accuse oneself in the confession in a generic way (saying, for example, ‘I had the desire to sin with a person of a different sex’), but one would have to explain the condition or state of that person, since the sin is specifically different according to the cases. It would be different if the desire had not fallen on a specific person, but in a general way on any person of different sex.

(b) The ineffectual evil desire, admitted under condition, is always dangerous; but it will be sin or not according as the condition imposed leaves intact its malice or suppresses it altogether; that is:

(b.1) It is always dangerous and useless. What is the use, for example, of saying: ‘I would like to eat meat if it were not a day of vigil’? It is a useless and absurd desire that supposes a certain dissatisfaction of the law that forbids to realize it, which involves a certain moral disorder.

(b.2) It will be a sin (grave or light according to the object) when the condition imposed does not take away its malice; for example, ‘I would commit such a sin if God did not punish me, or if there were no hell, or if it were possible for me’, etc.

(b.3) Of itself it would not be sin if the condition took away its malice; e.g., ‘I would eat meat if it were not a day of vigil’. But these desires are useless and idle, as we have already said, and we should try to avoid them.

(c) Keeping the order of charity, it is lawful to desire for oneself or for one’s neighbor a temporal evil that brings with it a spiritual good or a greater temporal good. And so, it would be licit, with due submission to the will of God, to desire death for oneself, or to desire it for one’s neighbor, in order to free oneself from the dangers of sinning, to go to heaven, and so on. Or also to wish for an illness that would prevent us from sinning, or the loss of the goods of fortune that are used in vices and sins, etc.

3) Sinful Joy

It is the deliberate complacency in a bad action performed by oneself or by others. By contrast, it is equated with sorrow or sadness for a good deed done or for not having taken advantage of the occasion to sin that presented itself.

The moral principles for judging sinful joy are:

(a) Joy over a sin committed renews the same sin with all its individual circumstances. The reason is because it supposes the approval of a bad action as it was executed, that is, with all its circumstances. If the sinner were to boast before other people of the sin committed, the circumstance of scandal would have to be added, so that the sin of boasting would be more serious than the one committed previously.

(b) To rejoice in the ingenious way in which a sin was committed, but rejecting the sin itself, would not be a sin, but dangerous and useless. And so, for example, it would not be a sin to rejoice in the ingenious way in which a theft, robbery, etc., was committed, without taking pleasure in the criminal act, but only in the way in which it was committed. However, it is evident that this joy is dangerous and useless, especially if it concerns inconvenient jokes or scabrous narrations, even while rejecting their sinful aspect.

(c) It is not licit to rejoice in a bad act because of the good effect it has brought about; but it is licit to rejoice in the good effect by rejecting the bad cause. And so, for example, it is not licit to rejoice in the murder of a person because of the inheritance that has befallen us; but it is licit to rejoice in the inheritance by rejecting the murder.

(d) It is a sin to feel deliberate sadness for not having taken advantage of an occasion of sin that presented itself. It is evident. This sadness supposes affection and complacency towards the sin that was not committed, and this is sinful and immoral.

(e) To feel deliberate sadness for having performed an obligatory good deed is mortal sin; if it was not obligatory, it is venial sin, unless there is just cause for it. And so, for example, he who is saddened for having returned a large amount of stolen goods, commits again the internal sin of injustice. If one grieves over something good that is not obligatory (for example, for having made a vow), it is venial sin, unless there is just cause for it (for example, for having done it too lightly and its fulfillment being too difficult).

(f) It may not be a sin, although it is always dangerous, to enjoy an action that is not currently licit, but which was or will be licit at the time of doing it.

And so, for example, the widow would not sin by remembering with joy the conjugal acts performed licitly during the marriage, as long as she does not consent to the evil movements that this memory can currently excite her, but it is already understood that this joy is very dangerous and imprudent and must be avoided. Let the same be said of the bride and groom in relation to the future acts of marriage. It is very dangerous to recreate oneself in anticipation of them, because, although theoretically it is an action that will be licit when it is carried out in marriage, it is almost impossible that it does not have repercussions in some evil movement or present desire, which would be illicit and sinful.

[All the above transcribed is taken from the book of Fr. Antonio Royo Marín, ‘Teología Moral para Seglares’, Volume 1, nn. 257-262].

In Christ and Mary,

Fr. Miguel A. Fuentes, IVE

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